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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

--------------------------------------------------------------INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16599

AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant, Agla Development Corporation, was
sued by plaintiff-respondent, Interstate Excavating, Inc., for
breach of contract and defendant counter claimed for breach of
contract and slander of title.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Jay E. Banks rendered a default judgment
in the amount of $46,101.70 and decree of foreclosure in favor of
respondent and dismissed appellant's counterclaim with prejudice
when appellant was not present at trial scheduled for May 7, 1979.
Appellant's subsequent motion to have the default judgment set
aside was denied by Judge Banks on June 18, 1979.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order
denying the motion to set aside judgment and the right to have a
trial upon the merits of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Since, the time of this writing, no transcript of the
proceedings held on June 18, 1979 pursuant to appellant's motion
to set aside judgment is available, appellant's statement of the
facts and argument is based solely on the recond as manifested
by the District Court file and pleadings.
This controversy arises from two contracts entered between the parties whereby respondent contracted to provide water
line and sewer improvements to two subdivisions owned by appellant.
Subsequently, there arose several disagreements and difficulties
between the parties which culminated in the filing of a suit by
respondents, who alleged breach of contract.
Appellant filed an Answer setting forth several affirmative defenses and counterclaimed alleging a breach of contract and
slander of title.

On April 16, 1979, the matter came before the

Honorable G. Hal Taylor for pre-trial settlement conference.

At

this time, appellant's counsel, Robert J. Haws, was given permission to withdraw as counsel.

That same day, counsel for

respondent mailed a Notice to Appoint Counsel to appellant's office
at 12655 South Redwood Road, Riverton, Utah.

Said notice included

the information that the case had been set for trial on May 7, 1979.
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On May 7, 1979, appellant failed to appear through
corporate officer or attorney and a judgment by default in the
amount of $46,101.70 was entered infavor of respondent and
appellant's counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice.

Appellant,

in the sworn statement accompanying his Motion to set aside
specifically states that no notice of the trial date was received
until a copy of the default judgment was received.
Upon learning of the default judgment, appellant immediately contacted its present counsel, Robert M. McRae, to represent
it in this matter.

Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, appellant filed a motion in the trial court to
set aside the judgment on May 31, 1979.

This motion was based on

the sworn statement of Lafe Brown, President of the appellant,
Agla Development Corporation, wherein he stated that appellant
has no notice of the trial date, that the notice to appoint counsel
was misplaced among numerous pleadings served on appellant's
office by mail, that appellant's then counsel, Robert J. Haws,
withdrew from a number of cases simultaneously, and that appellant
was subtantially prejudiced in that a meritorious defense and
counterclaim existed.
This motion to set aside was heard by the trial court
on June 18, 1979, and was denied on July 6, 1979.
Notice of appeal was given by appellant on the 19th day
of July, 1979.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment
was made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which reads as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect .... The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2),
(3), or (4), not more than three months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken ..• "
It is well settled that the rules of civil procedure are
to be liberally construed with a view to promote justice.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 68-3-2, Utah Code Anno.

Rule 1,

(1953).

In this regard, then Justice Crockett in Utah Sand & Gravel
Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d 703 (1965) stated:
"It is true that our new rules of civil procedure
were intended to eliminate undue and emphasis on
technicalities and to provide liberality in procedure to the end that disputes be heard and
determined on the merits .••. Liberality in their
interpretation and application should be indulged
where no prejudice or disadvantage to anyone results ... "
This statutory and judicial policy of liberality has been especially
evident in those decisions in which the interpretation of Rule 60(b)
has arisen in the context of a default judgment.

From the earliest

decisions of this Court, it has been emphasized that default

-4-
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judgments are viewed with suspicion and that the authority of the
trial court to set aside judgments obtained by default is to be
liberally applied so that there might be a decision on the merits.
Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P. 1033 (1890).
This suspicion and disfavor arises from the recognition that it
is a harsh and oppressive action to place a judgment rigidly and
irrevocably on a party without a hearing and that it is fundamental
to our system of justice that each party to a controversy by given
an opportunity to present his side of the controversy.
Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951 (1962).

Mayhew v.

Illustrative of the

following language from Heathman v. Fulran and Clendenin, 377 P.2d
189

(1962):
"Judgments by default are not favored by the
courts nor are they in the interest of justice
and fair play. No one has an inalienable or
constitutional right to a judgment by default
without a hearing on the merits. The courts,
in the interest of justice and fair play, favor,
where possible, a full and complete opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of every case ... "
Rule 60(b) and its statutory predecessorsl are of long

standing and have been construed by this Court on numerous
occasions.

These decisions have uniformly embraced several general

propositions, the first of which is that the trial court's determination involving a motion to set aside a default judgment is

lcomp. Laws, 1876, § 1293; Rev. Stat. 1898, § 3005;
comp. Laws, 1917, § 6619; 104-14-4 Rev. Stat., 1933; 104-14-4
Utah Code Anno. 1943.

-5-
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largely or discretionary matter, and as a concomitant, that this
court will reverse such a determination only in the event of an
abuse of that discretion.

For example, see Board of Education of

Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806

(1963).

Although

it is true that no general rule can be promulgated respecting the
exercise of discretion in setting aside or refusing to set aside
a default judgment since each case must necessarily turn on its
own peculiar facts and circumstances, Trumbo, supra, Heath v.
Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (1979).

This Court has, however, been careful

to define the scope of that discretion, and has by no means given
the trial courts a free hand to refuse to set aside default
judgments.

Thus, in Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995

(1956),

then Justice Crockett, writing for a unamimous court stated:
"We are entirely in accord with the authorities
cited by plaintiff to the effect that it is
generally regarded as an abuse of discretion for
a trial court to refuse to vacate a default judgment where timely application is made and there
is any reasonable grounds for doing so, to the
end that cases may be decided on their merits."
This two pronged requirement of timeliness and reasonable justification has been subsequently cited with approval in many decisions.

Mayhew, supra; Board of Education, supra; Westinghouse

Electirc Supply Co. v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876

(1975); and Olsen v.

Cununings, 565 P.2d 1123 (1977).
An examination of the factual setting reveals that
appellant did in fact satisfy both of the requirements cited above,
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that is, that the motion to set aside was both timely filed and
based on reasonable grounds.

As such, the trial court's refusal

to set aside the default judgment constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
That the motion was timely is clear.

Rule 60(b) im-

poses a three month time limitation when the motion to set aside
is neglect.

As soon as appellant became aware of the entering

of the default judgment through service by mail of the Judgment
and Decree of Foreclosure dated May 14, 1979, he immediately
contacted present counsel who prepared a Motion to Vacate Judgment
on May 18, 1979 (only four days after the notice of judgment was
placed in the mail), which motion was filed May 31, 1979 (seventeen
days after mailing of notice of judgment) .

This motion was not

noticed up for hearing until June 18, 1979 due to

t~e

illness of

the trial court, a fact which is not brought out in the record,
but which can be verified.

In any event, appellant acted with

dispatch and well within the three month framework provided by
Rule 60(b).
Furthermore, appellant provided reasonable grounds for
the failure to be present on the trial date, which grounds constitute excusable neglect.

Appellant never received notice in-

forming of the date that had been set for trial.

Appellant's

conduct prior to and subsequent to the default militates against
any other conclusion.

Appellant, upon the service of the Complaint

which initiated this action, promptly answered interposing several
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mertorious defenses and also filed a counterclaim.

Once again,

upon learning of the default judgment, appellant moved with dispatch in seeking to have the judgment set aside.

Never has

appellant manifested an intention to abandon this action.

To

the contrary, appellant has shown the diligence of one who is
being sued for a substantial amount of money in damages (over
$46,000) and who is counterclaiming for damages in excess of
$150.000.

The showing made by appellant is sufficient to require

the exercise of discretion in its behalf to set aside the default
judgment.
It is apparent that in exercising its discretion to
set aside a default judgment the trial court is engaged in a
balancing process between two valid considerations.
Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 711 (1953).

Warren v.

In that case this Court

stated:
"A rule which would permit the re-opening
of cases previously decided because of error
or ignorance during the progress of the trial
would in large measure vitiate the effects of
res judicata and create a hardship to the
successful litigant in causing him to prosecute his action more than once and possibly
lose the ability to collect his judgment;
on the other hand, the court is anxious to
protect the losing party who has not had the
opportunity to present his claim or defense."
Thus, the court, in exercising its discretion to refuse to set
aside a default judgment must weigh between the advantage of
enforcing the effect of res judicata and the disadvantage of not

-8-
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conducting a hearing on the merits.

While a contested action

yields a judgment wherein the value of res judicata is greatest,
a default judgment followed by a delayed appearance, as in the
instant case, carries with it a very low value of finality, that
is,
"There has been no examination of the merits
or, usually, matters of abatement such as the
statute of limitations, and no substantial investment of judicial time and authority. At
the same time, the appearance itself, even
though delayed, indicates that the defaulting
party wishes to contest the justness of the
plaintiff's claim.
Indeed, the only purpose
the default has served is that of enforcing
the rules concerning time appearance."
Restatement, Second, Judgments, Tentative Draft No. 6, pg. 19.
It appears that the concerns manifested by this Court
in Warren, supra, with respect to vacating judgments are outweighed by the benefits that would be bestowed by a hearing on
the merits in the instant case.

That is, the value of res

judicata is low since there has been a minimal

investment of

judicial time and authority and since respondent would not be
substantially prejudiced by a setting aside of the default and
a re-hearing on the merits.

Respondent will not be prejudiced

in his ability to collect the judgment and any costs and attorney
fees incurred by respondent in taking the default judgment can
be made a condition precedent to the setting aside of the judgment.
Thus, respondent would in no way be prejudiced by a setting aside
of the default judgment.

Furthermore, it is well established that

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in all doubtful cases, the court should resolve any doubt in the
balancing process towards granting relief from the default so as
to bring about a trial on the merits.

Cutler v. Haycock, 90 P.

897 (1907), Hurd v. Ford, 276 P. 908 (1929), Trumbo, supra.
Additionally, the Court in Culter made the point that when a
difference of opinion exists between the trial court and the
appellate court as to whether a reasonable basis exists for setting
aside the default judgment, then the judgment shall be set aside:
" ... While as we have already stated, the mere
difference of judgment between this court and
the trial court may not be conclusive, still
it raises a serious doubt, and in such a case
a reasonable doubts is always resolved in favor
of granting a trial upon the merits where none
was had ... "
It should not be forgotten that the allowance of a
vacation of judgment is a creative of equity and the equity takes
into consideration factors which may be irrelevant in actions at
law, such as the unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay in
bringing or continuing the action and the hardship in granting
or denying relief.

Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 260 P.2d 741 (1959).

Similarly, Professor Moore cites the following factors as being
relevant to the exercising of discretion:
1)

the general desirability that a final judgment

should not be lightly disturbed;
2)

the Rule should be liberally construed for the

purpose of doing substantial justice;

-10-
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3)

whether, although the motion is made within the

maximum time provided by the Rule, the motion is made within a
reasonable time;

4)

if the relief is sought from a default judgment,

whether in the particular case the interest of deciding cases or
the merits outweighs the interest in orderly procedure and in the
finality of judgments;

5)

whether there is merit in the defense or claim;

6)

whether there are any intervening equities which

and

make it inequitable to grant relief.
§

7 Moore's Federal Practice,

60.19.
With reagrd to these above cited factors, the above

statement can be made concerning the instant case:

1)

The motion was made with dispatch and in a reason-

able time (17 days) well within the three month limitation imposed
by Rule 60(b);

2)

Appellant has meritorious defenses and a meritorious

counterclaim involving substantial sums of money which will cause
appellant severe economic hardship if the motion is not granted;

3)

No prejudice will result to respondent if a trial

on the merits is ordered since respondent will have no greater
difficulty enforcing a subsequent judgment and the reimbursement
of any costs or attorney's fees incurred by respondent in obtaining
the judgment can be made a condition precedent to the setting aside
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of the default;
4)

The value of the trial judgment is minimal in the

default situation since little judicial energy was exhausted in
entering the default; and
5)

Justice requires the Rule to be liberally construed

and any doubt should be resolved in favor of setting aside the
default.
CONCLUSION
"It is indeed commendable to handle cases with
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition
in order to keep them up to date.
But it is
even more important to keep in mind that the
very reason for the existence of courts is to
afford disputants an opportunity to be heard
and to do justice between them."
Westinghouse Electice Supply v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876

(1975).

The refusal of the lower court to set aside the default
judgment constituted an abuse of discretion.

Appellant did timely

file his motion to set aside supported by reasonable grounds.
Disputed issues should be disposed of on substantive, rather
than technical grounds in the interest of justice and fair play.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of October, 1979.

/

Robert M. McRae
McRAE & DeLAND
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
72 East Fourth South, #355
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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MAILED OR DEVLIERED personally a copy of the foregoing
to E. H. Fankhauser of Cotro-Manes, Warr, Fankhauser & Green,
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, Judge Building, #430, Salt
Lake City, UT 84111, this 26th day of October, 1979 •
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